Have any of the National Labs adopted an anonymous "lessons learned" framework to openly review and address the impacts of an employee's state of well being (defined as comfortable, healthy, and happy), in the work environment while still adhering to HIPAA requirements?
There are many projects at LLNL, where employees are exposed to chronic and acute high levels of stress on a daily basis. Unfortunately, these stresses may lead to sadness, depression, helplessness, high blood pressure, heart attacks, substance abuse, etc.
LLNL has frequent "lessons learned" in print and on our internal Lab website to openly review employee injuries like, mixing incompatible materials, electrocutions/shock, etc., usually a result of not precisely following an established work/safety procedure. The goal of the "lessons learned" is to prevent future injury and or facility damage. Such accidents may be considered defendable from a liability perspective since the employee or employees, may not have followed an established work/safety procedure.
To my knowledge there is no "lessons learned" like transparent process at the Labs to openly review and address workplace, stress, harassment, bullying, and abuse that may lead to material employee health issues. HIPAA compliance while important to protect the individuals identity, should not serve as tool to avoid either the consequences for failure to provide an environment that promotes workforce well being or contractor liability.
11 comments:
Good idea, but maintaining workforce levels to meet “mission objectives” is about as granular as the lab contract and its annual report card go. No NNSA assessment for level of lab employee “well being”. Haven’t said this, if this type of “lessons learned” were implemented in good faith on a regular basis, it could lower stress, improve the work environment, and maybe save lives.
Years ago, this blog spoke of an LSEO tech, a NIF employee, that died, and some wondered, why there was not a LSEO memorial other than some HR memorial driven option that never occurred (?). Some bloggers suggested that LLNS management had something to do with his death (?).
Could such a “well being” policy have saved this LSEO tech from committing suicide just days after receiving an “intent to dismiss” memo from LLNS management in 2012? This is precisely why lab employee “well being” policies are extremely important.
Even when a hazard probability is determined to be unlikely, if the hazard severity is catastrophic (loss of life for example), a hazard mitigation plan is developed and implemented. Did such a hazard probability/hazard severity pre or postmortem review occur regarding this loss of life?
"Suicide Prevention in the Workplace
Tips for employers
Identify and recognize social dynamics and workplace factors that can affect mental health.
Harassment, bullying, and stigmatizing language increase the risk of suicide at work be prepared to name and respond to these realities.
Be aware that financial concerns and the risk of job loss or other sources of stress, fear, and uncertainty can result in thoughts of suicide. "
https://theworkingmind.ca/sites/default/files/suicide_prevention_guide_eng_15-jan-21.pdf
Constructive advice from this weblink. Employers should have this type of awareness program and many probably do. But, if the underlying premise for an employer is it never makes mistakes or will not admit to making mistakes, then moving forward with such a plan of awareness might be challenging at best. Rarely if ever, are lab managers removed from their duties for repeatedly being abrasive, a harasser, or a bully. We need to walk the talk, not just talk the talk. Kudos to employers that have meaningful awareness programs to sincerely address these issues. Life is important!
Many times I read the Lessons Learned and gained some insight.
But I recall in one instance where it was a total piece of nonsense that dismissed the root cause of the problem.
In 2009 an employee at NIF was released from his position, informed he was an Employee Between Assignment - EBA - and told to move his belongings out of his office and relocate to his EBA office.
In this move he used a government pickup truck.
At the parking lot of the EBA office location he had opened the door of the truck while it was running, got out and found it was not in Park.
The truck began to move backwards and it appears he attempted to semi-leap into the truck to step on the brake pedal and hit the accelerator instead.
The truck sped backwards, he fell out and was fatally injured.
The word got out quickly that the man was in a state of shock at being dismissed and was probably not in a proper state of mind to be handling a vehicle.
So we awaited a report and this is what was presented:
https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2014/04/f14/LLNL_TypeA_Report.pdf
Note that we have 6 items of causation in the report before this:
Item #7
The Board was not provided with any medical information to base any conclusions on the Driver’s medical state, Fitness for Duty or, cause of death.
The deputy director of the lab - a Bechtel implant - finally gave a televised report on the incident.
I remember some of the following items he gave as a lesson learned from the incident.
Have the key in your hand as you buckle and unbuckle your seat belt. If the key is in your hand, the vehicle can't be running while you're not wearing your seat belt. Of course if your driving a vehicle that is key less, that precaution goes out the wind. And I thought that at the time.
The lab should look into smaller vehicles such as the Smart Car -the implication is that you'd have better chances of surviving being run over by a micro-car. It also implies that Livermore employees were not fit to drive a pickup truck.
The lab should investigate the possibility of only allowing large delivery vehicles to move onsite during the off hours. A variation of keeping big trucks away from employees ala the Smart Car. That ignores the problem that for security reasons many building locked their dock doors in the off hours.
I can't recall other noteworthy assessments in this talk but did note one thing:
There was not a single mention of the fact the employee may have been in an emotional state caused by LLNL that should have precluded him from operating a vehicle. Why wasn't someone from management assisting him in this move?
Needless to say, I thought that the "Lesson Learned" from this accident was a CYA.
I also recall vividly the day after the accident one of my co-workers asking "I wonder what kind of mandatory web class we'll have to take for this one?"
"There was not a single mention of the fact the employee may have been in an emotional state caused by LLNL that should have precluded him from operating a vehicle. Why wasn't someone from management assisting him in this move? Needless to say, I thought that the "Lesson Learned" from this accident was a CYA."
This tragic loss of life occurred in 2009, and LLNS navigated around root causes that may very well have related to this employees new EBA status and his mental state as a result of the EBA status forced on him in 2009. But similar problems didn't end there, and this is what happens when root causes are purposely ignored for CYA purposes. In 2012, another NIF employee lost his life too, and again no transparency that would have exposed chronological events days, weeks, or months leading up to his loss of life in 2012. Makes one wonder how many other times extreme stress resulted in similar loss of life or other negative health conditions that were also handled and documented in CYA mode.
To 6/10/2022 6:18 PM, with respect, are you very certain the 2009 NIF employee was in fact placed into EBA status just before his vehicle accident death? To have no mention of the employees new EBA status, and if empathy or callousness was demonstrated in that EBA process, is alarming. Both the "Lessons Learned" and DOE/NNSA Accident report should have included this EBA variable. Willful nondisclosure of material facts to CYA over employee welfare and accident or death prevention?
The silence is deafening here. No counter positions to either the 2009 or 2012 loss of life events. The truth may be delayed, but over time, it is almost inescapably revealed. Still, we have the opportunity for constructive and life preserving conduct modifications from LLNS management, if we have genuine leadership and adequate NNSA oversight. Please don't let LLC profits or career ambitions keep us on the same path. Seriously. One life lost is too many.
NIF often boasted about churning NIF staff to the tune of about 10%/year. Eventually this medicine caught up with Moses himself. ok NIF sucked up funds from other LLNL programs, through a lab wide floor space tax plan rip off, and cared little about career corpses along the way. Not surprising that NIF employees were involved in at LEAST, 2 employee tragedies. Yet, fat stacks kept a coming to the management compliant. Unbelievable.
Either these NIF loss of lives are unrelated to NIF management practices, or NIF employees are scared sh_tless to speak of it. Where is the DOE IG on this matter? Out to lunch?
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