The latest in a series of security problems at LLNL. This one from the Inspector General. The link to the full report is at the end.
SUMMARY: The High Explosives Applications Facility (HEAF) is a state-of-the-art explosives research facility located on-site at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Livermore). The Office of Inspector General received a complaint alleging weaknesses with the controls over physical access to explosive material, as well as weaknesses with explosive inventory control and accountability in the HEAF explosive operations area.
We substantiated the allegations regarding weaknesses with controls over access and inventory of explosive materials at the HEAF. We found that Secret and Top Secret cleared individuals at Livermore had the potential to access the HEAF explosive operations area even though they lacked specific authorization and/or had not received required safety training. Additionally, we found that Livermore's Safety Access Training did not adequately address the requirements for unescorted access to the facility's explosive workrooms. Further, a unified perpetual system of records capable of tracking and accounting for explosives acquired, stored and expended at HEAF did not exist.
The identified issues regarding potential unauthorized access occurred, in part, because officials did not adequately consider the risks associated with access at the facility and the increased potential for theft or diversion of explosives. The weaknesses identified with the training occurred because the HEAF Safety Plan's requirement related to unescorted workroom access was not fully incorporated into the Safety Access Training module. In addition, the inventory controls for explosives within HEAF primarily focused on safety, and not tracking and accountability of high-risk personal property such as explosives from acquisition to disposition. Management generally agreed with our findings and recommendations and provided planned corrective actions that are generally responsive to our report findings and recommendations.
Begin forwarded message:
Subject: Report Alert Notice from DOE Inspector General
Date: October 4, 2013 9:30:21 AM PDT
The Office of Inspector General has issued a report titled “Accountability and Control of Explosives at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s High Explosives Applications Facility," (INS-O-13-06).
This report is now available for viewing and can be accessed by clicking the link below:
http://energy.gov/node/724051
If you are unable to access this report, please call (202) 586-4128 for assistance.
Tri-Valley Cares needs to be on this if they aren't already. We need to make sure that NNSA and LLNL does not make good on promises to pursue such stupid ideas as doing Plutonium experiments on NIF. The stupidity arises from the fact that a huge population is placed at risk in the short and long term. Why do this kind of experiment in a heavily populated area? Only a moron would push that kind of imbecile area. Do it somewhere else in the god forsaken hills of Los Alamos. Why should the communities in the Bay Area be subjected to such increased risk just because the lab's NIF has failed twice and is trying the Hail Mary pass of doing an SNM experiment just to justify their existence? Those Laser EoS techniques and the people analyzing the raw data are all just BAD anyways. You know what comes next after they do the experiment. They'll figure out that they need larger samples. More risk for the local population. Stop this imbecilic pursuit. They wan...
Comments
Have never known explosives to be considered 'personal property'. There are individuals who are each accountable for certain inventory.
Sounds like there is a fair point to make here, but hardly a crisis.
How many times is the word "safety" or "accountability" used in this piece vs. the word "security?" The lead-in is bogus.
Typical IG reporting - delay issuing a report until the issues reported on have no traction.
Under these rules of operation, materials in autos, lunchboxes and briefcases must be examined.
How about trusting the personnel that were vetted instead?
Gotta just trust that the folks that you have entrusted nuclear weapons stewardship will not often go haywire.