Here is the preliminary report by the IG following their investigation into wrong doings by LANLs Classification Officer. Your readers might find it very interesting because the first incident described gives some background into the events that led up to the firing of the LANL scientist who inadvertently publishing something classified.
Unfortunately, some things never change. Between the time this investigation began and the time the report came out, the CO was allowed to retire, and the DL and AD that knew about these events, but took no action, have been promoted to AD and PAD.
Comments
Huh?
Huh?
January 27, 2015 at 4:25 AM
You don't understand why this is important? You don't understand that this lead to the unjustified firing of a first-rate researcher? Go back and read the original poster's lead-in to the link. If you do even potentially-classified work, you should be scared as hell about this.
1. the fired LANS employee
2. the dismissed/denied DOE OHA complaint filed by
that former LANS employee
3. the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security request to
the DOE IG for an examination of the matter relating
to the dismissed LANS employee
What should scare the HELL out of lab employees is how defenseless you are against DOE Contractor's abuses without an outside advocate of some authority.
LANSLLNS "abuse", gross mismanagement", or an opportunity for "retaliation" after what was approved to be published. All of the above perhaps. Saying it "happens all the time in industry" is not a good defense strategy for LANSLLNS.
This matter is an example of a LANSLLNS "responsibility and accountability at ALL levels" failure, defined at the "Three Sigma Quality Management Principles" level, of the Six Sigma levels defined and accepted by "industry".
( Charlie "GQ" McMillan )
It would be interesting to know which stakeholders, managers, and DOE/NNSA/Contractor attorneys subject to direct or indirect collateral damage,
have comment, editing, or approval privileges to what the DOE IG may review or release. Say it isn't so.