Did Division Superintendent Randy Pico and Technical Associate Anthony
Rivera bump heads over HEAF employee high voltage/high energy SKA
Division Superintendents have a significant role and responsibility in the construction of job postings within their respective Divisions and in candidate selection. It looks like there were strong differences in high voltage/high energy SKA requirements for a HEAF assignment between Anthony Rivera and then Division Superintendent Randy Pico (“LLNS Manager A”?) as early as 2007.
From a 2015 “La Jicarita On-Line Magazine” story:
“In the early 2000s Rivera was responsible for correctly identifying a dangerous, unintentional high power laser initiated, High Explosive detonation scenario not addressed in the High Explosive Applications Facility (HEAF) Safety Procedures documentation. This safety concern was reviewed and subsequently included in the HEAF Safety Procedures. Prior to Rivera’s operational procedure correction, HEAF experimenters and technicians could have been exposed to High Explosive material subject to a time delayed explosive detonation causing injuries or fatalities.
In 2007 Rivera initiated a LLNL “Work Stop” for what he believed to be another imminent and potentially lethal threat to employees in HEAF. At the time Rivera had voluntarily moved from HEAF to another division at LLNL and became concerned about the qualifications of the employee who was hired to replace him in HEAF.
Before leaving his HEAF assignment in 2006 and accepting a lateral position at the National Ignition Facility, Rivera offered to review his LLNS B-Division funded assignment in HEAF with the employee who was hired to replace him. In 2007, as promised, Rivera had a meeting with this new HEAF employee.
According to Rivera, the employee was unqualified to work on potentially lethal high voltage, high energy Flash-Lamp Bank hardware that might place multiple employees in direct harm to electrocution. After numerous attempts by Rivera to have this safety concern addressed at a lower level with LLNS Manager “A”, this manager forced a subordinate employee, the Responsible Individual for this set of High Voltage, High Energy diagnostics, to accept and “add” the unqualified employee to the Integrated Work Sheet (IWS) paperwork without delay. The IWS is a project specific document that identifies a project’s purpose, procedures, hazards, and qualified employees approved by the IWS author and Responsible Individual.
Rivera then provided the 2007 “Work Stop” documentation to the NNSA Livermore Field office Employee Concerns Program Manager that detailed LLNL employment job posting fraud and the negligent assignment of an employee without the “Skills, Knowledge, and Abilities” to perform the job safely or effectively. LLNS Manager “A”, author of the job posting and responsible for creating that dangerous 2007 scenario, was subsequently promoted to a position of greater authority within Engineering.”
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