BLOG purpose

This BLOG is for LLNL present and past employees, friends of LLNL and anyone impacted by the privatization of the Lab to express their opinions and expose the waste, wrongdoing and any kind of injustice against employees and taxpayers by LLNS/DOE/NNSA. The opinions stated are personal opinions. Therefore, The BLOG author may or may not agree with them before making the decision to post them. Opinions not conforming to BLOG rules are deleted. Blog author serves as a moderator. For new topics or suggestions, email jlscoob5@gmail.com

Saturday, September 1, 2012

Grasping the Secrity Problems at Y12

Anonymously contributed: ------------------------------------------ Grasping the Secrity Problems at Y12 ------------------------------------------ There were so many problems that contributed to the July 28 security breach at the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant that the Inspector General had to lump them into categories just to keep them organized. Some things in the investigation report released Friday were almost incredible. For instance: In the predawn morning, after three Plowshares protesters had cut through security fences and entered the Protected Area without resistance, the activists hung banners, spray-painted messages, and used a hammer to bang against a wall of the plant's uranium storage facility. Inside the fortress-like facility, security guards just assumed the noise was coming from maintenance workers. Guards later told investigators they often weren't told about scheduled maintenance. They said it wasn't unusual for workers to just show up -- even in the dark, without warning -- in the high-security area. Y-12's highly touted security system failed at multiple levels, according to the damning, 18-page "Special Report" by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Inspector General. "We identified troubling displays of ineptitude in responding to alarms, failures to maintain critical security equipment, over reliance on compensatory measures, misunderstanding of security protocols, poor communications, and weaknesses in contract management," Inspector General Gregory Friedman wrote. Some problems identified by investigators were too sensitive to include in the publicly released report and were shared with federal officials privately. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- http://blogs.knoxnews.com/munger/2012/08/grasping-the-security-problems.html

8 comments:

Anonymous said...

In response to:
http://blogs.knoxnews.com/munger/2012/08/grasping-the-security-problems.html

August 31, 2012 5:11 PM

Inbreeding personified:

AB Analyst(Security & Safeguard Div)
EDUCATION & EXPERIENCE:
1. Bachelor’s degree in engineering,
2. or other related science or equivalent combination of related education and experience,
3. with a least 6 years of experience in Authorization Basis,
4. or 6 years of experience in Safeguards and Security at the programmatic level.

LOL...From BSE to 6 yrs on the guard force.

No, they didn't fill it with an engineer - A security grunt from the guard force got it.

Anonymous said...

"Our inspection confirmed that the
results on a performance test may have been compromised as two protective force
personnel were inappropriately permitted to view the computer simulations of four
scenarios on the test. In addition, we were provided information that inappropriate
actions had occurred going back to the mid-1980s in connection with performance tests at
the Department's Oak Ridge complex."

Why pick on Y-12? This practice has been going on at PX for several years.

Anonymous said...

"Our inspection confirmed that the
results on a performance test may have been compromised as two protective force
personnel were inappropriately permitted to view the computer simulations of four
scenarios on the test. In addition, we were provided information that inappropriate
actions had occurred going back to the mid-1980s in connection with performance tests at
the Department's Oak Ridge complex."

Why pick on Y-12? This practice has been going on at PX for several years.

Anonymous said...

"Our inspection confirmed that the
results on a performance test may have been compromised as two protective force
personnel were inappropriately permitted to view the computer simulations of four
scenarios on the test. In addition, we were provided information that inappropriate
actions had occurred going back to the mid-1980s in connection with performance tests at
the Department's Oak Ridge complex."

Why pick on Y-12? This practice has been going on at PX for several years.

Anonymous said...

Sounds like Oak Ridge really dropped the ball. I suggest NNSA reward this slip-shod performance with a new $5 billion uranium processing facility.

That should teach them!

Anonymous said...

Sounds like Oak Ridge really dropped the ball. I suggest NNSA reward this slip-shod performance with a new $5 billion uranium processing facility.

That should teach them!

Anonymous said...

Information now out in the public clearly shows that for years the local DOE/NNSA office was not up to the job. All of the leaders of this office going back five or more years need to be identified and removed from federal service. Some of them used their failure at Y-12 to move on to other positions. Typical of DOE/NNSA to move bad actors instead of re-moving them.

Anonymous said...

It will be insightful to see the ratings of each site by the local federal offices this year. Not only at Y12 but all across the complex. Methinks that the days of easy grading are bygone.

Blog Archive