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Thursday, November 1, 2012

Y-12 guards given cheat sheets by contractor

Y-12 guards given cheat sheets by contractor
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Not on the same level as the LANL scandals, but still raises questions about culture.

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http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/31/usa-security-nuclear-idUSL1E8LV89B20121031

4 comments:

Anonymous said...

From the Inspector General Report “Review of the Compromise of Security Test Materials at Y-12”

“A high-ranking staffer for the Y-12 site's contract operator, Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Y-12, implied he had provided advance examination details to personnel not approved specifically to receive them at another sensitive DOE facility, the investigators added.”

“National Nuclear Security Administration head Thomas D'Agostino, though, disputed the link between the testing incident and his agency's oversight of companies operating on its behalf. The evaluation shortcomings stemmed from “the abuse of discretion (or disregard of controls for further distribution) on the contractor’s part in releasing the materials to a broader group of employees,” not from the basic practice of providing hired firms with advance access to such details, the official said in a statement to auditors.”

A few years ago after observing an M&O Contractor manager falsify a Security Performance Test result, I brought it to the attention of the local NNSA Oversight manager who promptly dismissed my observation telling me that it was necessary to avoid “improper/unrealistic” test results. Being the coward I am, I let it go as my family’s wellbeing was more important. Believe me or not, doesn’t matter. This “good o boy” practice among s&S site mgrs & M&O has been going on for a long time & it will continue. I think Mr. D’Agostino believes what he said is true but it’s not.

Any wonder why our National Labs are in such disarray?

Anonymous said...

From the accounts in the aftermath of the Y-12 breach it looks like that they had a system in place - they just didn't follow the system, or it was in need or repair.
Contrast with LANL where it looks like that they do not have a working system in place.
Existing systems can be repaired if it is a few cameras out of service, or replacing federal and contractor staff with properly trained individuals, as emerged in the Y-12 Congressional hearings.
Not defending what happened at Y-12, but adding some perspective that it can be repaired.
The required repair at LANL appears to be more complicated.

Anonymous said...

Y-12 and cheating is an oxymoron.

Anonymous said...

Barney Fife could have done a better job protecting the dangerous nuclear materials at Y-12.

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