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This BLOG is for LLNL present and past employees, friends of LLNL and anyone impacted by the privatization of the Lab to express their opinions and expose the waste, wrongdoing and any kind of injustice against employees and taxpayers by LLNS/DOE/NNSA. The opinions stated are personal opinions. Therefore, The BLOG author may or may not agree with them before making the decision to post them. Opinions not conforming to BLOG rules are deleted. Blog author serves as a moderator. For new topics or suggestions, email jlscoob5@gmail.com

Saturday, October 5, 2013

The latest in a series of security problems at LLNL. This one from the Inspector General. The link to the full report is at the end. SUMMARY: The High Explosives Applications Facility (HEAF) is a state-of-the-art explosives research facility located on-site at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Livermore). The Office of Inspector General received a complaint alleging weaknesses with the controls over physical access to explosive material, as well as weaknesses with explosive inventory control and accountability in the HEAF explosive operations area. We substantiated the allegations regarding weaknesses with controls over access and inventory of explosive materials at the HEAF. We found that Secret and Top Secret cleared individuals at Livermore had the potential to access the HEAF explosive operations area even though they lacked specific authorization and/or had not received required safety training. Additionally, we found that Livermore's Safety Access Training did not adequately address the requirements for unescorted access to the facility's explosive workrooms. Further, a unified perpetual system of records capable of tracking and accounting for explosives acquired, stored and expended at HEAF did not exist. The identified issues regarding potential unauthorized access occurred, in part, because officials did not adequately consider the risks associated with access at the facility and the increased potential for theft or diversion of explosives. The weaknesses identified with the training occurred because the HEAF Safety Plan's requirement related to unescorted workroom access was not fully incorporated into the Safety Access Training module. In addition, the inventory controls for explosives within HEAF primarily focused on safety, and not tracking and accountability of high-risk personal property such as explosives from acquisition to disposition. Management generally agreed with our findings and recommendations and provided planned corrective actions that are generally responsive to our report findings and recommendations. Begin forwarded message: Subject: Report Alert Notice from DOE Inspector General Date: October 4, 2013 9:30:21 AM PDT The Office of Inspector General has issued a report titled “Accountability and Control of Explosives at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s High Explosives Applications Facility," (INS-O-13-06). This report is now available for viewing and can be accessed by clicking the link below: http://energy.gov/node/724051 If you are unable to access this report, please call (202) 586-4128 for assistance.

9 comments:

Anonymous said...

In addition, the inventory controls for explosives within HEAF primarily focused on safety, and not tracking and accountability of high-risk personal property such as explosives...

Have never known explosives to be considered 'personal property'. There are individuals who are each accountable for certain inventory.

Sounds like there is a fair point to make here, but hardly a crisis.

Anonymous said...

Let's see....

How many times is the word "safety" or "accountability" used in this piece vs. the word "security?" The lead-in is bogus.

Anonymous said...

Compared to posting videos of girlfriends of LANL guards firing off hundreds of rounds from a laboratory machine gun, this does not look like much of a security issue at all.

Anonymous said...

Once upon a time HEAF was a place of pioneering science. Now it is just a place where DTED has placed its flag as non-DTED management spectators that know better simply watch the quality and productivity erode away. Where is the leadership?

Anonymous said...

And a year after they started the audit, a meaningless report finally oozes out of the IG.

Typical IG reporting - delay issuing a report until the issues reported on have no traction.

Anonymous said...

Zzzzzzzzzzz. Wake me when the IG has moved on.

Anonymous said...

"Where is the leadership?" The leadership left when LLNS took over.

Anonymous said...

Any lab employee can readily mix energetic oxidizer and fuel components readily available from a hardware store, beauty shop or Costco to make energetic materials. With a little more quality control, they can make pseudo commercial or military grade energetic materials. They don't need to bother with HEAF raw naterials. The Li batteries in the hybrid Fusion autos pack quite a wallop if shorted.

Under these rules of operation, materials in autos, lunchboxes and briefcases must be examined.

How about trusting the personnel that were vetted instead?

Anonymous said...

Oh and with a pack of pseudafed and the "shake and bake recipe" they can make uppers as pure as Heisenberg's blue.

Gotta just trust that the folks that you have entrusted nuclear weapons stewardship will not often go haywire.

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